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Governing the GM Crop Revolution
Policy Choices for Developing Countries
Robert L. Paarlberg
The inclination of developing countries to promote 
or block the spread of GM crops can be judged 
by the policy choices they make.
Will developing countries adopt policies that promote the planting of genet-ically modified (GM) crops, or will they select policies that slow the spreadof the GM crop revolution? The evidence so far is mixed. In some
prominent countries such as China, policies are in place that encourage the inde-
pendent development and planting of GM crops. Yet in a number of other equally
prominent countries the planting of GM crops is not yet officially approved.
The inclination of developing countries to promote or block the spread of GM
crops can be judged by the policy choices they make in five separate areas: intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) policy, biosafety policy, trade policy, food safety policy,
and public research investments (Table 39.1).
Policy Options toward GM Crops
Intellectual Property Rights
If developing countries want to bring GM crop technologies into their farming sys-
tems, they may have to recognize some of the intellectual property rights claims of
the private companies that have been developing GM crops. At one extreme, they
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might even adopt the U.S. approach and provide full patent protection. A some-
what less promotional policy could offer only plant breeders’ rights as IPR guaran-
tees, which entitle breeders to use protected varieties as an initial source of variation
for the creation of new varieties as in the 1991 agreement of the International Union
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). A still weaker approach would
be to embrace an earlier 1978 version of UPOV, which preserves the privilege of
farmers to replant seeds from protected varieties on their own farms. Weaker still
would be to provide no IPRs at all for plant breeders.
No IPRs for plants or ani-
mals, or IPRs on paper
that are not enforced
No careful case-by-case
screening; risk
assumed because of
GM process
GM seed and plant
imports blocked; GM-
free status maintained
in hopes of capturing
export market
premiums
GM food sales banned,
or warning labels that
stigmatize GM foods
as unsafe to con-
sumers required
Neither treasury nor
donor funds spent on
any adaptation or
development of GM
crop technology
Table 39.1 Policy Options toward GM crops
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Note: UPOV = International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants; PBRs = plant breeders’
rights; WTO = World Trade Organization.
Intellectual
property
rights
Biosafety
Trade
Food safety
and con-
sumer
choice
Public
research
invest-
ment
Full patent protection,
plus plant breeders’
rights under UPOV
1991
No careful screening,
only token screening,
or approval based on
approvals in other
countries
GM crops promoted to
lower commodity pro-
duction costs and
boost exports; no
restrictions on imports
of GM seeds of plant
materials
No regulatory distinction
drawn between GM
and non-GM foods
when testing or label-
ing for food safety
Treasury resources spent
on both development
and local adaptations
of GM crop
technologies
PBRs under UPOV 1991
Case-by-case screening
for demonstrated risk,
depending on intended
use of product
GM crops neither pro-
moted nor prevented;
imports of GM com-
modities limited in
same way as non-GM
in accordance with sci-
ence-based WTO
standards
Distinction made
between GM and non-
GM foods on some
existing food labels but
not so as to require
segregation of market
channels
Treasury resources spent
on local adaptations of
GM crop technologies
but not on develop-
ment of new trans-
genes
PBRs under UPOV 1978,
which preserves farm-
ers’ privilege
Case-by-case screening
also for scientific
uncertainties owing to
novelty of GM process
Imports of GM seeds and
materials screened or
restrained separately
and more tightly than
non-GM; labeling
requirements imposed
on import of GM foods
or commodities
Comprehensive positive
labeling of all GM
foods required and
enforced with segre-
gated market channels
No significant treasury
resources spent on
GM crop research or
adaptation; donors
allowed to finance
local adaptations of
GM crops
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Biosafety
In the area of biological safety, the most promotional policy toward GM crops would
be to approve the use of these crops without any careful case-by-case screening for
unwanted geneflow or damage to nontarget species. A less promotional approach
would be to screen GM crops case by case but only for risks that can be scientifi-
cally demonstrated. A more cautious approach would be to hold crops off the mar-
ket case by case even without proof of risk so long as some scientific uncertainties
remained. The most cautious approach would be to assume risk in all cases because
of the novelty of the GM process.
Trade
Consumer acceptance of GM crops in major importing countries continues to
evolve. Assuming adequate consumer acceptance, a promotional trade policy toward
GM crops would be to seek the import of GM plant materials and seeds without
restriction and promote the planting of GM crops in hopes of cutting farm pro-
duction costs and becoming a more competitive exporter. A more neutral approach
would be to neither promote nor prevent the planting of GM crops and to treat GM
seed and commodity imports the same way as non-GM imports. A more cautious
trade policy approach would be to develop and implement a separate and more
restrictive method for regulating and labeling the import of GM seeds or com-
modities compared with non-GM. A preventive trade policy choice would be to ban
GM imports and block the planting of GM crops. If consumer acceptance of GM
crops in international markets continues to weaken, such a ban on planting GM crops
could be defended on trade grounds as a way to seek price premiums on the world
market as a “GM-free” exporter.
Food Safety and Consumer Choice
In this area a promotional policy would be to conclude that GM crops currently on
the market pose no new hazards to human health and to impose no additional inspec-
tion or labeling burdens on them. A less promotional approach would be to require
labeling of some GM foods in the interest of a consumer’s right to know but to make
the labeling standards lenient enough so that a complete segregation of GM from
non-GM commodities is not required. A still more cautious approach would be to
impose mandatory comprehensive labeling for all GM foods in a manner that would
require market segregation. A fully preventive approach would be to ban all GM foods
or to label them in ways intended to stigmatize and prevent their use.
Public Research Investments
Developing countries must also make a range of agricultural research investment
choices toward GM crops. At one extreme they might spend treasury resources to
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develop their own GM crops. As a second option they could invest only in the more
limited goal of backcrossing GM traits developed by others into their own domes-
tic germplasm. As a still more limited option they could allow their scientists to pur-
sue backcrossing of transgenes into local varieties only if donors were willing to pay
for it. At a preventive extreme they could decide not to spend any money, even donor
money, on GM crop research.
Policy Choices in Four Developing Countries
This system can be used to classify the actual policy choices toward GM crops that
were made by governments in Brazil, China, India, and Kenya in 1999–2000
(Table 39.2). Whereas China opted for relatively permissive policies toward GM
crops, Brazil, India, and Kenya have in most respects been more precautionary.
In Brazil, India, and Kenya biosafety approval has emerged as the principal
point of resistance against moving the GM crop revolution forward. This is a sur-
prising discovery given the fact that biosafety approvals for GM crops have not been
such a strong sticking point in the industrial world, given the traditionally weak agri-
cultural biosafety policies of most developing countries, and given the potential
biosafety benefits of some GM crop applications (those that permit fewer and less
toxic chemical sprays). It is particularly surprising that Brazil and India have moved
so slowly on biosafety approvals for GM crops, given the significant state investments
that are simultaneously being made in both countries to develop GM crops.
Table 39.2 Policies toward GM Crops in Brazil, China, India, and Kenya, 
1999–2000
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Intellectual property rights Brazil Kenya India
Chna
Biosafety China Kenya
Brazil
India
Trade China Kenya India
Brazil
Food safety and consumer choice Kenya Brazil
China India
Public research investment Brazil Kenya
India
China
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International pressures of four kinds help explain this pattern of caution in the
developing world: (1) environmental groups based in Europe and North America
have used media campaigns, lawsuits, and direct actions to project into the devel-
oping world a tone of extreme caution toward GM crops; (2) consumer doubts in
Europe and Japan regarding GM crops have discouraged planting of those crops by
developing-country exporters; (3) the precautionary tone of the 2000 Biosafety
Protocol governing transboundary movements of GM crops is reinforcing bio-
safety caution in the developing world; and (4) donor assistance to developing
countries in the area of agribiotechnology has often focused more on the possible
biosafety risks of the new technology than on its possible agronomic or economic
advantages. One reason for China’s more permissive biosafety policy is its greater in-
sulation from some of these international influences promoting caution elsewhere.
A further spread of GM crops into the developing world will therefore depend
on more than just the availability of suitable technologies. It will also depend upon
the future willingness of biosafety authorities in developing countries to give farm-
ers permission to plant GM crops. This willingness, in turn, will likely depend as
much on the external pressures and influences faced by these regulators as upon actu-
al documented threats to biosafety from GM crops.
